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Abstract
This paper examines the eﬀects of state corporate income taxes on the location of foreign
direct investment, taking into account the state governments’ behavior when setting taxes.
Ignoring the tax setting behavior of states may bias the estimate of the tax eﬀects on foreign
direct investment. States have a set of characteristics that inﬂuence investors’ decisions, some
of them are not observable by a researcher but states take them into account when they set
taxes. States can also act strategically with respect to other states when setting taxes. The
former behavior bias the estimated tax eﬀects because it creates correlation between the error
term and the tax rate. The latter behavior directly implies an endogenous tax rate.
We adapt a discrete choice model of diﬀerentiated products to estimate the tax eﬀects. This
approach allows us at the same time to control for the outside options of investors and to use
instrumental variables to solve the problem of tax endogeneity. We ﬁnd the tax elasticity to be
consistently around −1.
JEL: F23, H25, H71, H73, H87.
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment, State Corporate Income Taxes, Tax Endogeneity.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Although corporate income taxes should theoretically inﬂuence investors’ decisions about where
to locate their investments, empirical studies of the tax eﬀects show mixed results. Several articles
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4i nt h el i t e r a t u r eh a v ef o u n dt h a tt a x e sh a v en oi n ﬂuence on investment location at all1;s o m ef e w
articles have found a consistent and robust negative eﬀect, and a few others have found a positive
impact (see Carlton (1983), Coughlin, Terza, and Arrondee (1991), Luger and Shetty (1985), Hines
(1996), and Papke (1991)).2
The empirical work has mainly focused on the demand side of this story, estimating then a
reduced form model. Our view and the main motivation for this paper are that we can obtain an
important insight by also considering the supply side of the problem. By demand and supply sides,
we mean foreign ﬁrms as demanders for U.S. locations and U.S. states as suppliers of the locations
for investment.
Foreign investors, on the one hand, compare diﬀerent characteristics (including the state cor-
porate income tax) of each location before deciding where to invest, considering for this purpose
also locations outside of the U.S.. State governments, on the other hand, want to attract invest-
ment perhaps because of its positive eﬀects on income growth and employment. There are several
characteristics that each state supplies to investors, some of them are inherent to the state, such
as natural resources and geography, while some others are set by the states themselves, corporate
income taxes and the level of public goods for example. Some of these states’ characteristics are
unobservable by the researcher, like reputation and bureaucracy or corruption levels for example,
but they are considered by investors when they choose where to invest and by state governments
when they set taxes. This is the supply side of the story, which if it is not taken into account in
1In this paper we will argue that tax endogeneity may dampen the overall estimated tax eﬀects; consequently
neglecting tax setting behavior may lead to insigniﬁcant estimates of the tax eﬀects (even if the true eﬀect is negative).
2Wasylenko (1997) reviews recent research on the eﬀects state taxes have on economic development and reports a
summary of econometric results of tax eﬀects on business location.
5the empirical work may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the tax eﬀects on investment
location.
The process of setting taxes by state governments can also involve strategic interaction among
states. There is one strand of the public ﬁnance literature that has looked at the inﬂuence of
neighboring states’ (countries’) decisions (Besley and Case(1995); Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993);
Rork(2000)). Case, Hines, and Rosen (1993), for example, test the notion that state governments’
expenditures depend on the spending of similar states. They estimate that a dollar increase in
a state’s neighbors expenditures per capita increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents. This
illustrates how decisions among states interrelate and how important it is to take this interrelation
into account. For example, if Florida were to lower its tax rate in order to attract FDI, Alabama
may respond by cutting its tax rate; consequently, the increase in FDI into Florida may not be as
large. By ignoring tax competition in the analysis, the estimated tax eﬀects may be biased since it
also embeds the interaction among states. As it will be explained when we present the model, even
in the case where there is no strategic interaction at all, there may be a bias due to the correlation
between the error term of the demand for investment location and some unobserved determinants
of the tax setting process. For example, the discovery of an oil well in Alaska results in FDI inﬂow
into Alaska for two diﬀerent reasons. First, Alaska is now more attractive to foreign investors (at
least to investors in the oil industry). Second, Alaska may lower its tax rate as the revenue from
the oil well may relieve some pressure of the Alaskan government to raise revenue from FDI. In this
example, the tax elasticity would be biased upward (towards zero).
This paper, then, examines the eﬀects of corporate income taxes on the location of FDI in the
U.S. states, considering the endogeneity of the tax rates and the fact that foreign investors have
6outside options (investment locations outside U.S. states). We focus on FDI in the U.S. mainly
for three reasons. First, FDI has become increasingly important in the United States. Outlays by
foreign direct investors to establish businesses in the United States have increased from $15,333
millions in 1992 to $335,629 millions in 2000. U.S. businesses established by foreign direct investors
in 2000 had total assets of $482.02 billion and employed 770,000 people. Second, for foreign
investors, the corporate income tax is one of the relevant state characteristics to consider in their
investment decision.3 Third, we have access to surveys on foreign direct investment in the U.S. by
state and by source country for 5 years in a span of 23 years, which provides enough variation in
tax rates and state characteristics that allows the identiﬁcation of tax eﬀects.
In this paper, we use a structural model to estimate the eﬀects of corporate taxes on investment
location taking into account the tax setting behavior of state governments. The rest of the paper
is divided as follows. Section 2 presents a model of investors’ decisions for location of investment.
Adapting techniques from the discrete-choice literature, we present a model of aggregated invest-
ment demand that can be used to estimate “unbiased” and consistent tax eﬀects on investment
location. Section 3 discuss the states’ tax setting process. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5
shows the empirical results, and Section 6 concludes.
2A M o d e l o f D e m a n d f o r I n v e s t m e n t L o c a t i o n
A foreign investor can choose among 50 diﬀerent U.S. states and an outside location to locate
his investment. The presence of the outside location is extremely important. Without an outside
3The evidence in the literature has shown that manufacturing ﬁrms are more likely to locate or start up in states
with low corporate taxes. See Bartik (1991) and Ladd (1998) for a review of the literature.
7investment alternative, a uniform increase in tax rates by all states would not change the amount
of investment in each state.4
For the purpose of deciding where to invest, an investor will compare several diﬀerent character-
istics among states, one of which is the corporate tax rate. The tax rate is the price in the demand
for investment function5, but given that diﬀerent states have diﬀerent characteristics, we have to
think about diﬀerent locations as diﬀerentiated products (think about each state as a diﬀerent
brand of the same product).
If the investor decides to invest in state j, he maximizes his proﬁts by choosing the level of
investment as well as the quantity of labor hired in state j.
The investor’s problem, conditional on investing in state j, can be written as follows:
max
Lisj,FDIisj
πisj =( PQisj − wjLisj − riFDIisj − Fj)(1 − tj) (1)
s.t. Qisj = f(FDIisj,L ij)
where:
πisj =p r o ﬁts of investor i from country s if he invests in state j
4Furthermore, without an outside investment alternative a uniform increase in tax rates by all states would
improve the states’ welfare. With the outside investment alternative, states cannot uniformly increase their tax rates
without losing some of the investment elsewhere; consequently, a uniform increase in tax rates may not increase
welfare. Huber (1999) shows that if the wealth distribution is egalitarian, a coordinated increase in capital taxes
does not aﬀect welfare. For non-egalitarian wealth distributions, welfare can increase or decrease depending on the
redistributive impact of a higher capital tax.
Previous empirical studies of the tax eﬀects ignore the issue of outside investment alternatives in their estimation
strategy. This may result in a biased estimate of the tax eﬀects.
5Depending on how it is speciﬁed, the tax rate is a price per unit of proﬁts or per unit of capital invested in a
speciﬁcs t a t e .
8P = price of the product produced by the investor
Qisj = quantity of the product sold
wj = wage rate in state j
Lisj = quantity of labor hired by the investor in state j
ri = opportunity cost of capital for investor i6
FDIisj = quantity of capital invested by the investor in state j
tj = corporate tax rate in state j
Fj = ﬁxed costs of production
The production function f(FDIisj,L isj) is assumed to be constant returns to scale. The ﬁrst-








− ri =0 (3)
Using the ﬁrst-order conditions, we can write the conditional proﬁt function for the investor i
from country s who invests in state j as follows:
π∗
isj(P,ri,w j,t j) (4)
6This is the return on capital the investor would receive if he invests in an alternative location (ri =m a x k6=j {rk}).
7Alternatively, we could have speﬁcied the investor’s problem as:
maxLisj,FDIisj πisj = PQ isj − wjLisj − riFDI isj(1 + tj) − Fj
Under this speciﬁcation, the corporate tax rate has an impact on the optimal amount of capital and labor used.
For our purposes, it will still aﬀect the level of proﬁts obtained, and therefore, the place where the investor invests.
9For given values of P,ri,w j and tj the proﬁt function will determine the actual proﬁts an investor
i from country s will get if he invests in state j. Therefore, using the conditional proﬁt functions,
a foreign investor can compare the proﬁts he would get from investing in various locations. Hence,
the investor i from country s will choose to invest in state j if and only if the investment yields the
greatest proﬁt among all investment alternatives.8, 9 That is,
π∗
is =m a x{π∗
isn;n =0 ,...,50} (5)
Where n =0represents the outside option (an alternative investment location outside the 50
U.S. states).
Adding investment choices by all investors yields the aggregated demand function.10
2.1 Discrete-Choice Approach
The estimation of a demand function for diﬀerentiated products is a complex task, mainly
because of the large number of parameters that need to be estimated. In the case of N diﬀerent
products (50 states in this case), you have to estimate N own price elasticities and N (N − 1)
8We have assumed that each investor solves 51 diﬀerent maximization problems (one for each state and one for
the outside option), compares the 51 proﬁt levels that result from each maximization and then decides to invest in
one and only one location. The reasons to use this approach will be explained in the next section.
9It is a fact that several foreign investors have investments in more than one state. The discreteness of choice
assumption has been defended in the literature saying that investors invest, in this case, in plant and equipment in
one state at a time. Therefore, over time, they have investments in several states but when they decide about a
particular project, they choose only one state for it. Even though this may be a reasonable assumption in the context
of the data we use for the empirical part, we will only claim something less restrictive, which is that this model is a
good approximation for the true decison process of investors.
10We are aware that this is just an approximation to the real aggregated demand function. This approximation
might not be necessarily a smooth continuous function, but the alternatives are either to use a homogeneous product
approach or, as it will be discussed in the next section, to have a huge dataset that allows the estimation of all the
parameters involved. We think that the former approach introduces a bias that is worse than this approximation;
the latter, on the other hand, is not possible with the data available.
10cross-price elasticities.11 This implies an over-parameterization of the econometric model, which
makes it impossible to estimate in most cases. We solve this problem modeling product choice
explicitly in our estimation of the demand system. This approach is based on McFadden’s (1974)
work, which develops models of discrete choice to individual’s choice of products.12
A second issue in the estimation of a demand function under product diﬀerentiation is the
heterogeneity of consumers (investors in this case); unless investors have diﬀerent preferences or
production functions, all of them would invest in the same location.13 There are diﬀerent approaches
to model heterogeneity depending on the assumptions regarding the distribution of individual
attributes. The Logit, Nested Logit, and Generalized Extreme Value models, for example, assume
that heterogeneity enters the model only through a random shock. They also assume a distribution
of these shocks and a diﬀerent degree of correlation among them. Even though this approach places
some restrictions on the elasticities of demand, which will be explained in the next section, it is
more tractable and, therefore, is the one we will use.14
In this section, we follow Nevo’s (2000) approach to derive the aggregated demand for investment
by explicitly aggregating discrete investment decisions of foreign investors. For this purpose, we
ﬁrst deﬁne the proﬁt function of investor i from the country-year combination t for investing in
11Thus, there are 50 × 50 = 2500 elasticities to be estimated in our case. If we impose symmetry in our elasticity
matrix, the number of elasticities we would need to estimate would be reduced to: 50 +
50(50−1)
2 =1 2 7 5 .
12The following are good examples of the use of the discrete-choice framework. McFadden (1974) uses his discrete-
choice model to examine individual choice of products. Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995, 1998) study strategic
interactions in price setting among U.S. automakers. Nevo (2001) estimates demand and market power in the ready-
to-eat cereal industry.
13In this context, ”heterogeneity of investors” basically means that investors have diﬀerent proﬁt functions. This
can be due to diﬀerent tastes (with respect to state characteristics), diﬀerent production functions, or production in
diﬀerent economic sectors.
14The alternative is to use a Random Coeﬃcients Model that allows for more general substitution patterns. The
use of that approach not only would require additional information about the distribution of investors heterogeneity,
which we do not have, but also would require the use of simulation methods to be solved.
11state j:15
π∗
ijt(Xjt,ξjt,t jt,v i,θ) (6)
where X is a k-dimensional vector of observed state characteristics, ξ are unobserved state char-
acteristics, t is the state corporate tax rate, v are investor’s individual characteristics, and θ are
unknown parameters. Here we are assuming that all investors face the same state characteristics,
particularly the same tax rate.16
In this model, we assume the following speciﬁcation for the proﬁt function:17
π∗
ijt = −αtjt + Xjtβ + ξjt + εijt (7)
We also need to consider the possibility that the investor may decide not to invest in any of the
50 states at all. Theoretically, the outside option in this case is to invest in any other country of
the world; the proﬁt function from this option is:
π∗
iot(Xot,ξot,t ot,v i,θ) (8)
The functional form for the proﬁt function of the outside option is:
15There are t =1 ,...,It investors, j =1 ,...,50 states, and t =1 ,...,35 source country-year combinations (5 years,
3 of them with 8 countries, one with 7 countries, and one with 4 countries). See the data description in section 4.
16If diﬀerent investors face diﬀerent tax rates when they are investing in the same state, then tax rates would be
correlated with the error term (due to measurement error). This problem can be corrected using IV.
17The model is relatively general and with minor adjustments can be used with diﬀerent speciﬁcations. The linear
and loglinear cases basically require the absence of wealth eﬀects. That is the case when you consider maximization
of proﬁts, but it is not always true for utility maximization.
12π∗
iot = ξot + εiot (9)
The mean proﬁto ft h eo u t s i d eo p t i o ni sn o ti d e n t i ﬁed without either making more assumptions
or normalizing one of the U.S. states. We normalize ξot to zero. Deﬁning θ =( α,β), the proﬁt








δjt = −αtjt + Xjtβ + ξjt
In this model, investors are assumed to invest in one state, the one that gives them the highest
proﬁts (return).18 One investor is deﬁned as a vector of state speciﬁcs h o c k s ,(εisot,ε is1t,...,ε is50t).
Hence, the set of individual characteristics that lead to the choice of state j can be deﬁned as:
Ajt(δ.t)={εi.t | πijt ≥ πilt ∀ l=0 ...50} (11)
Then, for a given set of parameters, we can predict the FDI share of each state in each year,
as a function of state characteristics, tax rates, and unknown parameters. If ties occur with zero
probability, the FDI share of the state j as a function of the mean proﬁt levels of all the 51 locations
given the parameters is:
18This assumption is needed; otherwise, we would have to compare every single combination of diﬀerent states, and
that makes the model not tractable (the number of parameters increases dramatically). Hendel (1999) has relaxed





where P(·) represents the population distribution function.
The estimation strategy is to choose parameters that minimize the distance between the FDI
shares predicted by the model and the observed ones19, which implies to solve the implicit system
of equations:
s.t (X.t,t .t,δ.t;θ)=S.t (13)
where s.t(·) are the predicted FDI shares deﬁne by equation (12), and S.t are the observed FDI
shares.
This strategy gives estimates of the parameters that determine the distribution of investors’
attributes, but it does not solve the correlation between tax rates and unobserved state character-
istics.
The use of a Logit demand model allow us to solve the problem of over-parameterization pro-
jecting the states into a space of characteristics and the main assumption we have been relying on,
is that investors’ heterogeneity enters only through a separable additive random shock εijt.U pt o
this point, the model we have presented here is very general and no more restrictive than other
models used in the literature. However, a second assumption of the Logit model is that εijt is
i.i.d. and is distributed according to a Type I extreme value distribution. These latter restrictions,
which are made in order to compute the integral in equation (12), are more restrictive and have
19By making assumptions on the distribution of ε, the integral of equation (12) can be calculated analytically.
14implications for the tax elasticities of the demand equation.








k=0 exp(−αtkt + Xktβ + ξkt)
(14)
Now, equation (13) can be solved analytically to get:
δjt =l n( Sjt) − ln(Sot) (15)
where Sijt and Siot are the observed FDI shares in state j and in outside investment option
respectively.
Thus, the demand equation to be estimated becomes:
ln(Sjt) − ln(Sot)=−αtjt + Xjtβ + ξjt (16)






= −αtjt(1 − sjt)
Summarizing, the Logit model allows us to solve the over-parameterization of the model but





20It is important to note that the tax elasticity is driven by the functional form assumption about how the tax
rate enters the proﬁt function. If, for example, the proﬁt function were log-linear, rather than linear, the implied
elasticity would be roughly constant. We will discuss this possibility in the empirical part.
153 Tax Setting
There are several models of tax setting in the literature and with minor modiﬁcations to any of
them we could show why the corporate income tax rate is endogenous and how it bias the estimates
of tax elasticities if the endogeneity is not considered. However, we will not present a speciﬁct a x
setting model in this section for two reasons. First, it is beyond of the scope of this paper to
estimate a structural tax setting equation of the state governments and draw conclusions from it.
The main goal is to obtain a consistent estimator of the tax elasticity of foreign investment. Second,
to use a speciﬁc model would not provide more insight about the endogeneity of the tax rate and its
consequences on the estimation of the demand for investment, but would complicate the analysis
and the results would be very speciﬁc to the model used.
In general, we can consider that a state government wants to maximize the welfare of its
citizens and needs to ﬁnance the provision of public goods with taxes. In the case of the U.S.
states governments, they mainly use sales, corporate income, and personal income taxes for this
purpose. When setting their corporate income tax rate, the state governments probably consider
how attractive the state is for investors, the beneﬁts in terms of employment and income growth
of attracting more investment to the state, the corporate income tax rates of their neighbors and
their budget constraints (total revenue to be raised, revenue collected from sale and personal income
taxes, etc.).
In the model of investment location presented in the previous section, a state is deﬁned by
a set of characteristics and some of those characteristics are not observed, though they inﬂuence
investors’ decisions (demand); therefore, they will be captured in the error term. States know those
16characteristics, and they take them into account when setting taxes.21 This implies that the tax
rate is endogenous, and, therefore, the estimate of the tax eﬀects on FDI (α in equation (16)) might
be biased.22
The total tax eﬀect on FDI can be decomposed in two eﬀects: the direct eﬀect, and the indirect
























Since in estimating the tax eﬀects, we control for observed characteristics on the right-hand-side
of equation (16), the bias would only come from the unobserved factors. If any
dξ
dt is diﬀerent from
zero, then estimating the tax eﬀects on FDI without considering the unobservables would bias the
estimated tax elasticity. The direction of the bias will depend on the signs of ∂FDI
∂ξ and
dξ
dt,w h i c h
will depend on the type of unobservables. Let’s consider some examples of unobservables:
-If ξ is the tax abatements oﬀered by other states, and there is tax competition, we would expect
dξk
dtj to be negative24.I nt h i se x a m p l e ,
∂FDIj
∂ξk will also be negative.25 Consequently, ignoring tax
competition would bias the estimated tax elasticity upward.
21These state characteristics are not observed by the researcher, but they are observed by investors and by state
governments. Examples of these characteristics are: reputation of the state (honesty, bureaucracy, quality of services,
quality of workers), and eﬀects of advertisement (promotion of the state).
22Using a set of Montecarlo results, Berry (1994) has shown that estimation methods that ignore the endogeneity
of prices (taxes) in the presence of unobserved product (state) characteristics can be severely misleading.
23Recall that from (12), foreign direct investment (FDI) is a function of the corporate tax rate t, the observable
state characteristics X (public good provision, population, miles of road per area, real price of energy, etc.) and other
unobserved characteristics ξ (state reputation, non-tax investment incentives, other states’ tax abatement programs,
corruption level, etc.): FDI = f (t,X,ξ).
24If a state reduce its corporate tax rate, other states may respond by increasing their tax abatement oﬀers to
foreign investors.
25If other states increase their tax abatement oﬀers, the amount of FDI in the state would decrease.
17-If ξ is the bad reputation for doing business in the state (e.g. corruption), we would expect
dξj
dtj
to be negative. To compensate for the bad reputation, the state may want to reduce its corporate
tax rate to attract investment. In this case,
∂FDIj
∂ξj will be negative, states with bad reputation will
receive less foreign direct investment, ceteris paribus. Consequently, ignoring the unobserved bad
reputation would bias the estimated tax elasticity upward.
In the two previous examples, the estimated tax elasticity would be biased upward26. In general,
the bias could be either upward or downward.
3.1 Instrumental Variables
One way to deal with the endogeneity bias is to use instrumental variables for the tax rate in the
demand equation. Natural candidates to be used for this purpose are the exogenous variables in the
tax setting equation that do not appear in the demand equation. Then, the natural instruments
are some determinants of the state budget and tax setting process that are not correlated with
unobserved determinants of foreign investment in the states.
If we look at budget practices across states, we can observe a good variation among them. On
the one hand, there are diﬀerent revenues and expenditures limitations. These limits constrain
the annual growth of revenues or expenditures either to a ﬁxed rate or to a one based on one or
more of the following variables: inﬂation rate, population growth, growth of personal income, and
ratio of revenue to personal income. On the other hand, states have a statutory or constitutional
requirement to balance the budget. The two most common requirements are that the governor
must submit a balanced budget and that the legislature must pass a balanced budget.
26If the true elasticity is negative the estimated elasticity would be biased toward zero (or positive).
18We think that these budget practices are good instruments for the tax rate. A potential concern
would be that the observed correlation between budget rules and ﬁscal outcomes might reﬂect just a
correlation of these two variables with an omitted third one, speciﬁcally citizens (voters) preferences
for ﬁscal outcomes. However, the empirical literature on state budgeting and ﬁscal policy supports
the hypothesis that budget rules matter and many of these studies have controlled for some measure
of state voter preferences (Alt and Lowry (1994), Crain and Miller (1990), Bohn and Inman (1996),
Elder (1992), Poterba (1994), Poterba (1995) and Rueben (1997)). Therefore, we use as instruments
a set of dummy variables that reﬂect these diﬀerent budget limits.
4D a t a
The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) publishes a benchmark survey of foreign direct in-
vestment in the U.S. roughly every ﬁve years. The data report FDI by state and by source country
for major investing countries in the United States. These countries are Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.27 The survey provides
information on the value of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) owned by foreign U.S. aﬃliates
in the manufacturing industry.28, 29
In the empirical work, we use the PPE data by state and source country for the years 1974, 1980,
1987, 1992 and 1997. As the outside option for investors, we use the total amount of investment in
ﬁxed capital (GFX) in their own countries.30, 31
27Investment outlays from these 8 countries accounted for 83.3% of the total foreign investment outlays in 2000.
28Foreign direct investment in manufacturing represented 42.7% of the total FDI in the U.S. in 2000.
29An aﬃliate is deﬁned to be foreign-owned if one or more foreign investors own at least 10% percent each.
30That means Sjt =
PPEjt P
j PPEjt+GFXt and Sot =
GFXt P
j PPEjt+GFXt in equation (16).
31We would have preferred to use FDI in the rest of the world as the outside option for each country, but the data
19The benchmark survey of 1974 has information only for four countries (Canada, Japan, Switzer-
land, and the United Kingdom) and the 1980 survey is missing Australia (it has data for 7 countries).
Therefore, we have 1750 (50 × 3 × 8+5 0× 7+5 0× 4) observations, of which only 9 of them are
equal to zero.32 However, among these 1750 observations, 195 (11.1%) are suppressed by the BEA
for conﬁdentiality reasons33, and 30 (1.7%) are reported as being less than $500,000 but no speciﬁc
amount is provided.34 We deal with these missing data problems in three ways: ﬁrst, the two types
of observations are excluded from the sample; second, we estimate an Interval Regression using
the 30 observations that we know represent a PPE of less than $500,000; and third, we estimate
an Interval Regression assuming that all missing observations represent PPE of less than $500,000.
The results are very similar across the three cases.35
There has been a long discussion in the literature about how to measure tax variables. The most
common approaches are to use either the statutory tax rate for each tax or the ratio of revenues
collected to income or population. The latter approach has the advantage that it captures aspects
of both the nominal rate and the tax base, and in that sense it might be a better measure of the
tax burden. In this case and following Hines (1996), we decided to use the top marginal statutory
tax rate of the state corporate income tax. The main reason for using statutory tax rates is that
are not available for some of the years in the sample.
32This is relevant because an important assumption of our model is that we observe positive shares for all States.
The reason is the need to invert the share equation and, therefore, the need of a one to one mapping from the mean
proﬁt level to the observed shares.
33The states with the highest number of missing observations are: Alaska (with 16), Idaho (with 13), and Montana
(with 11). In terms of source countries they are: Switzerland (with 40) and Netherlands (with 39). 1980 is the year
with most missing observations (with 61).
34The source countries with the highest number of observations of this type are: Japan (with 10) and Switzerland
(with 13). In terms of states they are: Delaware and South Dakota (both with 4). 1974 is the year with most of this
type of observations (with 19).
35We also estimated the same regressions dropping either the 5 states or the 3 source countries with most missing
observations. The results were again very similar, but still we had around 8% of missing observations in both cases
(instead of the 11% we have for the full sample).
20for newly locating ﬁrms or expanding businesses we think that the eﬀect of taxes on the rate of
return is better measured by the marginal rate of taxation on the investment or the user’s cost of
capital.
It is important to mention that we are omitting other tax rates and tax incentives from the
analysis, and both are relevant on investors’ decisions. In the case of other taxes omitted, probably
property taxes are the most important ones. The problem is that property taxes are set at a local
level and, therefore, it is diﬃcult to characterize them at a state level. Furthermore, the BEA data
is aggregated by state and by source country and therefore there is no information on where within
each state the investment is located. This omission can introduce a bias in the estimation of the
tax eﬀect due to the potential correlation between the corporate tax rate and the error term (which
includes the omitted tax rates); this provides another reason to use instrumental variables. In the
case of tax incentives, they can play a major role in the location decision of a speciﬁc ﬁrm. It
is a fact that several cities and/or states have oﬀered and reached agreements on tax abatements
with particular ﬁrms, but there are no data available to include those agreements in the analysis.36
Furthermore, even if data on tax abatement agreements were available, we would need investment
data by ﬁrm (and not only by state as we have) to include those agreements correctly.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of the data. The mean corporate tax rate is 6.6% with a
range between 0% and 12.7%, which provides good tax variation across states to estimate tax
eﬀects. Still, we have to take into account the fact that some states allow corporations to deduct
36Papke (1995), using site and ﬁrm speciﬁc data from six midwest states, examines the impact that tax incentives
(investment tax credits and property tax abatements) have on the after-tax rate of return. He ﬁnds that tax incentives
have very modest eﬀects on the net returns to new investment. Speciﬁcally, he ﬁnds that a 50% property tax abatement
for new machinery and equipment "...has a neglible incremental impact on the baseline after-tax rate of return".
21their federal tax liabilities. In those cases we multiply the state corporate tax rate by (1− federal
top statutory corporate tax rate).37 This variable is called Etaxrate in Table 1 and is the one we
use in the empirical work.
We also need to consider the source country tax regime. Multinational ﬁrms potentially have
to paid taxes in every country and/or state where they are located and also in their home country.
As a way of reducing double taxation on the foreign investments of these ﬁrms, governments use
two diﬀerent tax systems: foreign-tax-credit and exemption. Countries using a foreign-tax-credit
system tax ﬁrms based on their worldwide earnings but allow a credit for taxes paid to foreign
governments (Japan and United Kingdom in this sample). Countries using an exemption system
directly exempt foreign income from home-country taxation (Australia, Canada, France, Germany,
Netherlands and Switzerland in this sample). As a result, investment from countries with an
exemption system should be more sensitive to corporate income taxes. We use a dummy variable
for distinguishing these two tax regimes, the variable Credit Country is equal to 1 if the source
country has a credit tax regime and 0 if it has an exemption tax regime.
An important aspect of the states’ tax system is the use of diﬀerent formulas to allocate the
national proﬁts of a ﬁrm among all the states where it operates. Almost all states use a three factor
apportionment formula, which allocates the ﬁrm’s proﬁts based on its location of property, sales
and payroll. McLure (1981) showed that the use of the apportionment formula basically transforms
the state corporate income tax into three separate taxes on the factors consider in the formula.
Given that the data we are using as a measure of investment is property, plant and equipment, we
consider the weight given by each state to the property factor in the apportionment formula. The
37Eight states in 1974, six in 1980, seven in 1987, ﬁve in 1992, and three in 1997.
22variable apportionment then, is just the weight assigned to property in the apportionment formula
of each state.
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Real PPE ($ millions) 1555 1119.38 2170.19 0 35419.8
Sjt 1555 0.005 0.009 0 0.0893
State Corporate Tax Rate 1750 0.0663 0.0287 0 0.1265
Etaxrate 1750 0.06314 0.0281 0 0.1265
Population (in thousands) 1750 4874.42 5254.14 344 32182.12
Real Wage ($ per hour) 1750 13.476 1.81 9.96 21.81
Road per Area (mile−1) 1750 1.609 1.16 0.09 6.12
Real Price of Energy 1750 7.40 2.50 2.83 16.70
Revenue Limit 1750 0.089 0.285 0 1
Expenditure Limit 1750 0.334 0.472 0 1
Legislature 1750 0.489 0.50 0 1
Credit Country 1750 0.2857 0.4519 0 1
Apportionment 1750 0.2875 0.0835 0 0.333
Domestic Fixed Capital Investment 1750 260920 315710 24357 1296402
The variables Expenditure Limit and Revenue Limit are dummies equal to one if the state
has a constitutional or statutory provision that constraints the annual growth of expenditures and
revenues respectively, and zero otherwise. The variable Legislature is equal to one if the state
legislature must pass a balanced budget, and zero otherwise.
There are some public goods provided by the state that help business activity, like infrastructure,
for example. As a measure of this type of public goods we use the variable road per area, which
is calculated as the total number of miles of roads in each state divided by its area (measured in
squared miles).
The variables Real Wage and Real Price of Energy represent the prices of other inputs in the
production process and therefore, considered and demanded by foreign investors. Real wages are
the state average wage in manufacturing measured in dollars per hour, deﬂated by CPI, and the
23real price of energy is an index published by the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, also deﬂated by
CPI.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the corporate tax rate by year.38 As we can see, the
mean and the median tax rate have been increasing over time, and the standard deviation has been
decreasing since 1987. This might be a symptom of some degree of collusion rather than one of tax
competition, but that is an empirical question beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2: States Corporate Tax Rate by Year
Year Mean Std. Dev. Median Min. Max.
1974 0.0594 0.0284 0.06 0 0.12
1980 0.0622 0.0295 0.06 0 0.12
1987 0.0676 0.0303 0.07 0 0.12
1992 0.0710 0.0293 0.0781 0 0.1265
1997 0.0705 0.0271 0.076 0 0.12
Table 3 shows the changes in the state corporate tax rates over time. If we look at the whole
period 1974-1997, we have that 29 states had a higher corporate tax rate in 1997 compared to the
one they had in 1974, 7 have a lower one, and 14 states have exactly the same one. If we split
the period in two, we can see that more states increased their tax rates between 1974 and 1987
than between 1987 and 1997 (27 compared to 15). The opposite is true in terms of decreases in
the tax rate (11 states compared to only 5). This table may suggest that the degree of competition
(collusion) was lower (higher) between 1974 and 1987 and that after 1987 (at least compared to
the previous period).
38There are four states that have had a zero tax rate over the whole period (Nevada, South Dakota, Washington
and Wyoming) and seven states that have never changed their tax rate during this period.
24Table 3: Tax Rates Variation
1974-97 1974-87 1987-97
Increases 29 27 15
Mean Increased 0.0225 0.0213 0.01163
Reductions 7 5 11
Mean Reduction 0.0155 0.0236 0.00732
No Change 14 18 24
5R e s u l t s
Table 4 shows the Interval regressions39 of equation (16). Model (1) uses the statutory corporate
tax rate directly as a variable to capture tax eﬀects, and the models (2) to (5) use the set of budget
limits dummies described before as instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of the tax
rate.40 The ﬁrst regression (model (1)) shows a negative relationship between FDI share and state’s
corporate tax rate, but the coeﬃcient is not signiﬁcant, and the elasticities implied are quite low.
The tax elasticity, calculated at mean and median values, is−0.19 and −0.2 respectively.
Model (2) has the same speciﬁcation of model (1) but corrects for the possible tax endogeneity
using instrumental variables. Now, the coeﬃcient of the state’s tax rate is −16.911, which implies
a tax elasticity of −1.06 at the mean values and −1.11 at the median values.41 This result shows
an upward bias that occurs when tax eﬀects are estimated without taking tax endogeneity into
account. This is consistent with the results in the literature that have shown very small or zero tax
eﬀects.
39The reason to use Interval Regression estimation is because 12.8% of the investment data in the sample are missing.
Recall that these missing data represents positive amounts of investment, but no speciﬁc amounts are reported by
the BEA (11.1% due to conﬁdentiality reasons and 1.7% because the amount invested is less than $500,000).
40For the ﬁrst regression standard errors were calculated using the Huber-White estimator. For the regression in
which we use instrumental variables, we calculated the standard errors for the second stage using bootstrapping with
1000 repetitions. In all regressions the standard errors are calculated clustering by state.
41Hausman tests rejects the exogeneity of the tax rate in model (1) and the overidentiﬁcation test in model (2)
does not reject the validity of the IV.
25A corporate income tax elasticity of −1 means that a one percent increase in a state corporate
tax rate would decrease, on average, the share of FDI received by a state in 1%, ceteris paribus.
Table 4: FDI Equations
ln(sjt) − ln(sot) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corporate Tax Rate -3.020 -16.911 -18.079 -8.725 -9.959
(4.708) (4.627) (4.803) (4.459) (4.633)
Tax Rate×Credit Count. 5.619 5.489
(8.394) (8.072)
Tax Rate×Apportionm. -22.973 -22.702
(8.780) (9.110)
Credit Country -0.584 -0.575
(0.563) (0.546)
Population 0.000175 0.000183 0.000182 0.000179 0.000178
(0.00002) (0.000008) (0.000009) (0.000009) (0.000009)
Real Wage -0.0260 -0.0287 -0.0262 -0.0324 -0.0299
(0.0510) (0.0292) (0.0298) (0.0287) (0.0284)
Real Energy Price -0.1166 -0.1067 -0.1070 -0.0995 -0.0998
(0.0342) (0.0215) (0.0225) (0.0232) (0.0230)
Road per Area 0.3261 0.458 0.4482 0.4317 0.4223
(0.1516) (0.0720) (0.0684) (0.0721) (0.0688)
Constant -6.329 -5.753 -5.6196 -5.792 -5.665
(0.8326) (0.4631) (0.4760) (0.4797) (0.4589)
Wald Chi2 106.91 117.16 96.86 122.92 126.12
Log Likelihood -3131.11 -3121.01 -3125.44 -3125.59 -3122.61
Observations 1555 1555 1555 1555 1555






Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors. All the regressions include year dummies.
The coeﬃcients for the population and road per area variables are both positive, signiﬁcant, and
with the expected sign. Total population in one state captures in some way the level of business
26activity; therefore, it should have a positive impact on the amount of FDI the state receives.42
The elasticity at the mean is 0.912, which means that a 1% increase in the population of a state
would increase its FDI share on average by 0.9%, ceteris paribus. The number of miles of roads per
area measures the level of a public good provided by the state that helps business activity; thus it
should also have a positive impact on FDI. The implied elasticity evaluated at the mean is 0.733
which implies that a 1% increase in the miles of roads per area would increase, on average, the
share of FDI by 0.73%, ceteris paribus. The real price of energy captures the cost of some of the
non-labor inputs of production; therefore, the negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for that variable
in the regressions is the expected one. The elasticity at the mean is −0.786, what implies that an
increase in the real price of energy of 1% would decrease the share of FDI by 0.78% on average.
The coeﬃcient for the wage variable is negative but not signiﬁcant. A negative sign would
be expected if higher wages increase the costs of a ﬁrm and, therefore, decrease its proﬁts. One
possible explanation for the non-signiﬁcance ﬁnding is that the real wage variable is also capturing
higher productivity of the labor force. Therefore, we decided to include a variable for education
in the regression, and, for this purpose, we used the number of high school graduates per capita.
The coeﬃcient on the education variable was positive and not signiﬁcant in the regression, and
the size of the coeﬃcient for wages was reduced to half and was still not signiﬁcant.43 If we
use education instead of wages in the regression, the coeﬃcient on education is positive and not
signiﬁcant, and the other coeﬃcients and standard errors are almost identical. We decided, then,
to report the regression with wages instead of education because it should reﬂect labor costs better.
42We also tried real retail sales by state instead of population, and the results were very similar.
43The correlation between the education and wage variables is −0.6339.
27The elasticity with respect to wages, even though it is not signiﬁcant, is −0.385, which implies that
a 1% increase in the real wage in a state would decrease its FDI share by 0.38%.
Model (3) adds to model (2) the credit country dummy, alone and interacted with the tax rate.
The inclusion of these two variables attempts to control for the tax regime of the source country
and its eﬀects on the eﬀective state tax rate faced by investors from these two diﬀerent tax regimes.
The coeﬃcient for the tax rate is −18.08, which implies a tax elasticity of −1.14 at mean values and
−1.19 at median values for investment from countries using an exemption regime. As expected,
the coeﬃcient for the credit country dummy interacted with the tax rate is positive, showing that
investors from countries using credit regimes are less sensitive to corporate income tax rates. The
tax elasticity for credit countries is −0.79 at mean values and −0.82 at median values. However,
the coeﬃcient for this variable is not statistically diﬀerent from zero, and the tax elasticity is not
statistically diﬀerent from the one for exemption countries. The credit country dummy alone is
negative, but is also non statistically diﬀerent from zero.
Model (4), following the theoretical results of McLure (op. cit), adds to model (2) the property
weight in the apportionment formula interacted with the tax rate. The coeﬃcient of this variable
is −22.97 and is statistically signiﬁcant. The elasticity of the share of FDI from country s that
state j receives (ssj)i s−0.412 at mean values, and −0.5 at median values. The implication of this
result is that if a state increases the weight of the property factor in its apportionment formula,
the share of total FDI received by that state would decrease around half percent on average, ceteris
paribus. Now, the coeﬃcient of the corporate tax rate is −8.73, it is statistically signiﬁcant but its
size is half as before (compared with model (2)). The tax elasticity calculated at mean values is
−0.96 and calculated at median values is −1.08, both very similar to the ones estimated without
28considering the eﬀect of the apportionment formula. These results show that the property factor
in the apportionment formula has an important impact on the eﬀective state corporate income tax
rate that investors face and, therefore, on the fraction of FDI that states receive. However, in terms
of the corporate income tax elasticity, controlling for the apportionment system does not change
the results obtained when only the top statutory tax rate is used.44
Finally, model (5) controls for both, the apportionment formula and the tax regime of the
source country. The coeﬃcient for the corporate tax rate is statistically signiﬁcant and higher than
in model (4), but still around half the size compared to models (2) and (3). The eﬀect of the
property weight of the apportionment formula interacted with the tax rate is again negative and
signiﬁcant. The FDI share elasticity with respect to the property weight of the apportionment
formula is −0.407 at mean values and −0.498 at median values, basically identical as before (model
(4)). The coeﬃcient for the credit country dummy variable interacted with the state tax rate, as
in model (3), has the expected sign but it is not signiﬁcant. The tax elasticity for an exemption
country is −1.06 and for a credit country is −0.69, both at mean values, although the elasticity for
credit countries is not statistically diﬀerent than the one for exemption countries.
Table 5 shows the results of the ﬁrst-stage regression corresponding to model (2).45, 46 The
coeﬃcients on the variables Revenue Limit and Expenditure Limit are both negative and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant, showing that state governments that face constraints to the annual growth of its
expenditures and revenues set lower taxes than states that do not have these limits. The coeﬃcient
44Hines (1996) also estimates the eﬀects of corporate income tax on FDI with and without correction for appor-
tionment system. He ﬁnds no diﬀerence in the results.
45The ﬁrst-stage regressions corresponding to models (2) to (5) show similar results.
46The ﬁrst-stage regression includes all the exogenous variables of the model, but the coeﬃcients and standard
errors for the variables real wages, real price of energy, population and roads per area are not reported in the table.
29on the Legislature variable is positive and signiﬁcant, which shows that states whose legislatures
must enact a balanced budget have higher taxes. The F-test of joint signiﬁcance of the three vari-
a b l e sw eu s e da si n s t r u m e n t si s97.18, which strongly rejects the hypothesis of non-signiﬁcance.
Furthermore, every instrument by itself is highly signiﬁcant.47
Table 5: IV First-Stage Regression













Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors
As we had mentioned it at the end of section 2.1, the tax elasticity in this model is driven by
the functional form assumption about how the tax rate enters the proﬁt function. Therefore, to
check the robustness of our results, we estimated the same ﬁve models again, assuming this time
a log-linear proﬁt function. The results were vey similar and the estimated tax elasticities were
slightly larger.48
Finally, it is also important to consider the role of the outside option in these results. For this
purpose, we estimated equation (16) again without including the outside option.49 Table 6 compares
47We also estimated the ﬁrst stage equation using every instrument alone and every combination of two of them
and then we performed likelihood ratio and Hausman tests among the diﬀerent speciﬁcations, and the unrestricted
model was always prefered.
48The results are available from the authors upon request.
49We used the same procedure and the same instrumental variables, but sijt was calculated over the total investment
30the estimated elasticities, for model (2), evaluated at the means with and without considering the
outside option. As can be seen from the table, when no outside option is considered the estimated
tax elasticity is lower. Even though this bias might be small, its direction is consistent with what
the theory predicts, investors with no outside options would be less sensitive to tax changes.
Table 6: Tax Elasticities at Mean Values





Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Our results show a robust, negative, and statistically signiﬁcant tax elasticity for foreign direct
investment when tax endogeneity and investors’ outside options are considered. The estimated
elasticity is larger in absolute value compared to what other studies have found.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we have used a Logit Model of demand adapted from the discrete-choice literature
to investigate the eﬀects of corporate taxes on investment location. Theoretically taxes should have
a negative impact on investment location, unless they represent a ﬁscal package that includes greater
amounts of public goods and services that beneﬁt investment, in which case the total package might
have a positive impact. The empirical literature shows mixed results; most of the studies ﬁnd no
tax eﬀects; some of them, a negative eﬀect, and some others show a positive eﬀect. The question,
of each country in the US (instead of total investment in the US plus total investment in their own countries). The
dependent variable in the equation was ln(sijt) instead of ln(sijt) − ln(sot).
31then, is whether the theoretical models are not capturing very well how investors take decisions
or whether the empirical work is missing something, or both. We do not pretend to give a ﬁnal
answer to this question, but with this study we do want to highlight the importance of considering
tax endogeneity and the existence of outside options for the empirical work in this matter.
The evidence presented in this paper shows that state governments do consider some of the state
characteristics that might be attractive (or not) to investors when setting taxes. Ignoring the tax
setting behavior of state governments then, may bias the estimate of the tax eﬀects on FDI. Using
states’ statutory and constitutional budget limits as instrumental variables and explicitly allowing
an outside option for investors, we correct for this bias. We also consider in the empirical analysis
the eﬀects of the apportionment formula used by the state governments to allocate the national
proﬁts of a ﬁrm among all the states where it operates, and the eﬀects of the source country tax
regime. The results show that the property factor in the apportionment formula has an important
impact on the eﬀective state corporate income tax rate that investors face and, therefore, on the
fraction of FDI that states receive. However, in terms of the corporate income tax elasticity,
controlling for the apportionment system does not change the results obtained when only the top
statutory tax rate is used. Even though the sign of the coeﬃcient is the expected one, the elasticity
for credit countries is not statistically diﬀerent than the one for exemption countries. Overall, we
ﬁnd the FDI to be quite sensitive to states’ corporate tax rates. The estimated tax elasticity is
estimated consistently around −1.
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